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T. E. Lawrence
and Zionism
Extracts from Lawrence of Arabia, The Authorised
Biography by Jeremy Wilson (London, Heinemann, 1989; New York,
Atheneum, 1990) and other sources.
In quoting these
extracts in isolation, we have assumed that readers have a general
knowledge of the diplomatic background, the history of undertakings
given by Britain to the Arabs, and the progress of the war in the Middle
East.
Meetings
between Lawrence and Aaron Aaronsohn, a radical Zionist, Jerusalem, 1917
[Aaronsohn] had met Lawrence as early as February 1917, and had noted in his diary, '. . . A new appearance in the Arab Bureau - 2nd Lieutenant Lawrence, archaeologist, very versed in Palestinian topics. Overbearing.'
On 12 August 1917, according to the diary, they met again. 'This morning I had a conversation with Capt. Lawrence. An interview without any evidence of friendliness. Lawrence had too much success at too early an age. Has a very high estimation of his own self. He is lecturing me on our colonies, on the spirit of the people, on the feelings of the Arabs, and we would do well in being assimilated by them, by the sons of Arab etc. While listening to him I imagined to be present at the lecture of a Prussian scientific anti-Semite expressing himself in English. I am afraid that many of the archaeologists and reverends have been imbued by 'l'esprit boche'. He is openly against us. He is basically of missionary
stock'
Harsh words indeed; in contradiction of the words used by
Weizmann. As far as we know Aaronsohn did not change his mind. He continued to see in T. E. Lawrence the close associate of
Feisal, the 'Bedouins' and the 'Arabs' of whom he had the lowest opinion.
Source: Amram Scheyer,
'The Lawrence - Aaronsohn Relationship' Journal
of the T. E. Lawrence Society, Vol. V, No. 1, Autumn
1995. This article is available online.
1) T. E.
Lawrence's letter to Sir Mark Sykes, 9 September 1917 (Wilson pp.
442-3)
[Sir
Mark] Sykes's letter to [Gilbert] Clayton [of 22 July 1917*] also
contained a passing reference to the
Zionist question. It was well known that he was interested in this
subject, and the British staff in Egypt also knew that some kind of
discussions
on the matter were taking place in London. Jewish ambitions
in Palestine were common knowledge in Cairo, where Aaron Aaronson,
a prominent figure in the movement, was hoping to set up a Zionist
office. Lawrence had good reason to be interested in a question that
so obviously affected the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs.
On
September 7th, he wrote to Sykes at length, asking both about Zionist
aims and about the future of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. He sent this
letter to Clayton, with the comment: 'Some of it is really thirst
for information, and other is only a wish to stick pins into him .
. . One must have the Jewish section cleared up: and I fancy we may
(if we win) clear up the French section ourselves.'15
Lawrence
wrote to Sykes: 'General Clayton showed me a letter from
you which contained a message to myself - and this has prompted
me to ask you a few queries about Near East affairs. I hope you will
be able to give me an idea of how matters stand in reference to them,
since part of the responsibility of action is inevitably thrown on
to me, and unless I know more or less what is wanted there might be
trouble.
'About
the Jews in Palestine, Feisal has agreed not to operate or
agitate west of the [Wadi] Araba-Dead Sea-Jordan line, or
south of the Haifa-Beisan line . . .
'You
know of course the root differences between the Palestine Jew
and the colonist Jew: to Feisal the important point is that the former
speak Arabic, and the latter German Yiddish. He is in touch with the
Arab Jews (their H.Q. at Safed and Tiberias is in his sphere) and
they are ready to help him, on conditions. They show a strong antipathy
to the colonist Jews, and have even suggested repressive measures
against them. Feisal has ignored this point hitherto, and will continue
to do so. His attempts to get into touch with the colonial Jews have
not been very fortunate. They say they have made their arrangements
with the Great Powers, and wish no contact with the Arab Party. They
will not help the Turks or the Arabs.
'Now
Feisal wants to know (information had better come to me for him
since I usually like to make up my mind before he does) what is the
arrangement
standing between the colonist Jews (called Zionists sometimes) and
the Allies . . . What have you promised the Zionists, and what is
their programme?
'I
saw Aaronson in Cairo, and he said at once the Jews intended to
acquire the land-rights of all Palestine from Gaza to Haifa, and have
practical autonomy therein. Is this acquisition to be by fair purchase
or by forced sale and expropriation? The present half-crop peasantry
were the old freeholders and under Moslem landlords may be ground
down but have fixity of tenure. Arabs are usually not employed by
Jewish colonies. Do the Jews propose the complete expulsion of the
Arab peasantry, or their reduction to a day-labourer class?
'You
know how the Arabs cling even to bad land and will realise that
while Arab feelings didn't matter under Turkish rule . . . the condition
will be vastly different if there is a new, independent, and rather
cock-a-hoop Arab state north and east and south of the Jewish state.
I
can see a situation arising in which the Jewish influence in European
finance might not be sufficient to deter the Arab peasants from refusing
to quit - or worse!
*
Sir T. B. M. Sykes to G. F. Clayton 22.7.1917. Sykes Papers, St.
Antony's College, Oxford.
Note
15. T. E. Lawrence to
G. F. Clayton 7.9.1917. Clayton Pape5rs 693/11/9-12, Durham (photocopy
of original).
2. Sykes-Picot and
the Balfour Declaration published (Wilson pp. 467-9)
Lawrence's
visit to Cairo [in December1917] also enabled him to catch
up
on Intelligence about recent political developments. Among the
most serious questions to be faced were those which had been raised
by the Bolshevik Revolution of early November. The new Russian regime
was vehemently opposed to the war and had taken immediate steps to
reach an armistice with the Central Powers. This meant that Turkey
would soon be able to transfer troops from the Caucasus Front to
Palestine
and Mesopotamia.
The
Revolution had another disconcerting consequence. Within days of seizing
control, the Bolsheviks had published secret Allied treaties
including the Sykes-Picot Agreement. During the following weeks, these
texts had appeared in newspapers throughout the world. The Sykes-Picot
terms were a gift to Turkish propaganda, and British officials had
waited anxiously for Arab reaction.
This
had not been slow in coming. On November 26th, Wilson reported
that Hussein had 'hinted that H. M. Government possibly had some secret
understanding with France and that Zeid and Feisal were being delayed
by us from advancing north on this account . . . the King expressed
his distrust of French policy and . . . stated that Syria was his
. . . His honour was concerned . . . as he had promised the Syrians
he would give them help and never desert them.'11
It
was feared that Arab support might disappear completely unless
the Allies took some step to counteract the damage done by the
Sykes-Picot
revelation. The situation was made still more fraught by the release,
at much the same time, of the Balfour Declaration, which provided
for a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine. Reviewing the situation,
Clayton wrote to Sykes: 'The lack of any definite pronouncement against
annexation, especially in Syria, is causing distrust and uneasiness
. . . The general principles of the Anglo-French Agreement are known,
but there is still no certain knowledge of Entente intentions
for the future. As regards Syria, there is an impression that we may
be only marking time until our military successes place us in a position
to hand [it] over to France with as few pledges as possible. This
suspicion is ever present in the mind of the Sherif of Mecca . . .
'The recent announcement of His Majesty's Government on the Jewish
question has made a profound impression on both Christians and Moslems
who view with little short of dismay the prospect of seeing Palestine
and even eventually Syria in the hands of the Jews, whose superior
intelligence and commercial abilities are feared . . .
'All the above facts tend to prepare the ground for German-inspired
. . . propaganda and pave the way for an attractive proposal [to
the
Arabs] for independence under nominal Turkish suzerainty . . .'12
Notes:
11.
C. E. Wilson to Arab Bureau for Sir F. R, Wingate, telegram W1966,
16.11.1917. FO 141/654/356.
12.
G. F. Clayton to Sir T. B. M. Sykes, transmitted in Sir F. R. Wingate to
Foreign Office, London, telegram 1281, 28.11.1917. Sykes Papers, St.
Antony's College, Oxford.
The
situation in May 1918 (Wilson pp. 502-3)
Lawrence
realised that the delay in Palestine [because Allenby was obliged to
return troops to Europe] would be a severe blow to the Arabs. In the
first place, he had been
counting on Allenby's forward movement to resolve the dangerous
stalemate
at Maan. Now, however, the Turks would be free to concentrate their
attention on Jaafar Pasha's army. They were already building up their
forces near Amman, and an attack seemed imminent. If they were allowed
to move south, the Arabs might soon be driven back off the Maan plateau.
In
the longer term, the delay could have even more serious consequences.
Lawrence later wrote: 'We on the Arab front had been exciting
Eastern Syria, since 1916, for a revolt near Damascus, and our material
was now ready and afoot. To hold it still in that excited readiness
during another year risked our over-passing the crisis ineffectually.'1
The
risk of declining morale among Feisal's present forces was no
less worrying: 'This was now 1918, and stalemate across its harvest
would have marked the ebb of Feisal's movement. His fellows were living
on their nerves (rebellion is harder than war) and their nerves were
wearing thin. Also the big war was not looking too well.'2
These
difficulties had to be seen in the context of a much wider anxiety.
Since the autumn of 1917, the Anglo-Arab alliance had been under great
strain. The cause was Arab knowledge of the Sykes-Picot terms (greatly
exploited by Turkish propaganda) and of the Balfour Declaration. These
agreements affected Syria, Lebanon, Mesopotamia and Palestine. If
they were implemented, only the Arabian Peninsula would be autonomous.
In other words, the richest and most fertile of the Arab provinces
had been reserved for the Allies, and political independence was to
be denied to the overwhelming majority of Turkey's subject peoples.
Arab leaders felt cheated of much that they had been fighting for,
and bitterly angry that they had not been consulted about these
agreements.
Their principal reason for continuing the alliance with Britain was
a belief that the Allies would win the war. During the spring of 1918,
however, even this seemed open to doubt. The EEF advance to Jerusalem
and Jericho had been impressive, but there it had stopped, to be
followed
only by two disastrous raids across the Jordan which had done
immeasurable damage to British prestige. Arab suspicions that the Allies
might be weakening had been reinforced by news of the successful German
offensive in Europe.3
Notes
1.
T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, 1922 text, Chapter 110.
2.
T. E. Lawrence, comment on the typescript draft of 'T.E. Lawrence' in
Arabia and After by B. H. Liddell Hart. B:LH pp 113-4.
3.
German forces had launched a major offensive on the Western Front on 21
March 1918 and, within four months, recovered all the territory that the
Allies had gained since 1915.
3.
Weizmann's meeting with Emir Feisal, 4 June 1918 (Wilson pp.
512-14)
There
had been another important diplomatic contact
while Lawrence was away in the north. This was a visit to Feisal's
camp by Dr Chaim Weizmann, a leading British Zionist. Some weeks
earlier,
Weizmann had arrived in Palestine at the head of a Zionist Commission
authorised by the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet. The Commission's
objects, according to a telegram to Wingate from the Foreign Office,
were 'to carry out, subject to General Allenby's authority, any steps
required to give effect to the Government declaration in favour of
the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people
. . . Among the important functions of the Commission will be the
establishment of good relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish
communities in Palestine . . . It is most important that everything
should be done to . . . allay Arab suspicions regarding the true aims
of Zionism'.29
Clayton, who was closely involved in the administration of Palestine,
hoped that the mission would help to reduce hostility between Jews
and Arabs. He had written to Sykes on February 4th: 'I have urged
Lawrence to impress on Faisal the necessity of an entente with
the Jews. [Feisal] is inclined the other way, and there are people
in Cairo who lose no chance of putting him against them. I have
explained
that it is his only chance of doing really big things and bringing
the Arab movement to fruition.'30
Subsequently,
Lawrence had told Clayton: '[As] for the Jews, when I see Feisul next
I'll talk to him, and the Arab attitude shall be sympathetic, for
the duration of the war at least. Only please remember that he is
under the old man, and cannot involve the Arab kingdom by himself.'
He would advise Feisal to visit Jerusalem when the demands of the
campaign permitted, and 'all the Jews there will report him friendly.
That will probably do all you need, without public commitment, which
is rather beyond my province.'31
In
late May, a message had been sent to Akaba proposing a meeting
between Feisal and Weizmann, who would be accompanied by a liaison
officer: 'The interview would take place at Arab Headquarters, to
which they would motor. Wire if this is convenient to Sherif Feisal
and Lawrence. It is important the latter should be present at the
interview.'32 In the event, however,
Lawrence had
left to join Nasir before the date of Weizmann's journey to Akaba
was telegraphed from Cairo. He was therefore absent when the meeting
took place on June 4th.
His
place was taken by Joyce, who afterwards reported that the discussions
lasted about forty-five minutes: 'Sherif Feisal expressed
his opinion of the necessity for co-operation between Jews and Arabs
. . . As regards definite political arrangements, [he] was unwilling
to express an opinion, pointing out that in questions of politics
he was acting merely as his father's agent and was not in a position
to discuss them . . . Dr. Weizmann pointed out that the Jews do not
propose setting up a Jewish government, but would like to work under
British protection with a view to colonizing and developing the
country without in any way encroaching on anybody's legitimate interests
. . . Feisal declared that as an Arab he could not discuss the
future of Palestine, either as a Jewish colony or a country under
British Protection. These questions were already the subject of much
German and Turkish propaganda, and would undoubtedly be misinterpreted
by the Bedouin if openly discussed. Later on when Arab affairs were
more consolidated these questions could be brought up.
'Sherif
Feisal personally accepted the possibility of future Jewish
claims to territory in Palestine . . . but he could not discuss them
publicly'.33
It
was only during a subsequent visit to Allenby's headquarters that
Lawrence had an opportunity for significant discussions with Weizmann.
Not long afterwards, when he was questioned on the topic by a member
of Wingate's staff, he said: 'The real imminence of the Palestine
problem is patent only to Feisal of the Sherifians. He believes that
we intend to keep it ourselves, under the excuse of holding the
balance between conflicting religions, and regards it as a cheap price
to pay for the British help he has had and hopes still to have . .
.
'Dr.
Weizmann hopes for a completely Jewish Palestine in fifty years,
and a Jewish Palestine, under a British façade, for the moment.
He is fighting for his own lead among the British and American Jews:
if he can offer these the spectacle of British help, and Arab
willingness
to allow Jewish enterprise free scope in all their provinces in Syria,
he will then secure the financial backing which will make the new
Judaea a reality . . . Weizmann is not yet in a position, as regards
Jewry, to make good any promise he makes. In negotiating with him
the Arabs would have to bear in mind that they are worth nothing to
him till they have beaten the Turks, and that he is worth nothing
to them unless he can make good amongst the Jews . . .
'Until
the military adventure of the Arabs under Feisal has succeeded
or failed, he does not require Jewish help, and it would be unwise
on our part to permit it to be offered.'34
However,
Lawrence thought that in the more distant future Feisal might
have something to gain from co-operation with the Zionists. As soon
as the Turks had been defeated, vociferous factions in Syria would
turn against the Sherifians. Much of the upper-class intelligentsia
would prefer autonomy, while the Maronite Christians and other
pro-French
elements would side with Paris in calling for the introduction of
French advisers and capital. At this point Feisal might, with advantage,
turn to the Zionists: 'If the British and American Jews, securely
established under British colours in Palestine, chose this moment
to offer to the Arab state in Syria help (1) against the Syrian
autonomous elements, [and] (2) against the foreign railways, ports,
roads, waterworks and power companies, Sherif Feisal would be compelled
to accept the help, and with Anglo-Jewish advisers could dispense
with the effendim and buy out the foreigners. This would give time
for a development of an Arab spirit in Syria from below'.35
In
June 1918, however, Lawrence was faced with more urgent questions
than
the future relationship between Arabs and Zionists. The plans
for an offensive were complete, and he was shortly to go to Egypt
to make arrangements with GHQ and to seek Wingate's support for
requesting
the transfer of regulars from the Hejaz.
Notes
29.
Foreign Office London to Sir F. R. Wingate, c.9.1.1918. CAB27/23.
30.
G. F. Clayton to Sir T. B. M. Sykes, 4.2.1918. FO 371/3398 fo.620.
31.
T. E. Lawrence to G. F. Clayton, 12.2.1918. FO882/7 fo. 268.
32.
GHQ to Commandant Akaba, dispatch 2300, 24.5.1918. WO95/4370.
33.
P. C. Joyce, 'Interview between Dr. Weizmann and Sherif Feisal'
5.6.1918. FO 882/14 fos. 364-5. Lawrence's absence from this meeting is
confirmed by Arab Bulletin No. 93, 18.6.1918, p. 208. Weizmann
later implied that Lawrence had been present (see Trial and Error,
London, Hamish Hamilton, 1949 p. 292, and also a confused account in Friends,
pp. 219-20. In both places Weizmann claims to have met Lawrence in June
at or near Akaba.)
34.
T. E. Lawrence, quoted in G. S. Symes, Tour of Duty (London,
Collins, 1946) pp. 31-2. These notes were dictated by Lawrence, at
Symes's request, while he was waiting for an aeroplane at Aboukir
areodrome. Symes does not give a date, but it cannot be earlier than
mid-June 1918, when Lawrence seems to have had his first serious talks
with Weizmann. Clayton wrote on June 18th: 'Weizmann . . . has done very
well with Faisal and at least has established excellent personal
relations. He has also had long discussions with Lawrence, and they seem
quite agreed on main principles' (G. F. Clayton to G. A. Lloyd
18.6.1918. Lloyd Papers GLLD 9/3. Churchill College, Cambridge).
Lawrence's pocket diaries show that the date must be either June 15th or
July 9th 1918.
35.Ibid. p. 32
Lawrence
at the Eastern Committee of the British Cabinet, 29 October 1918 (Wilson
pp. 376-7)
As regards French
advisers [in Syria], 'Feisal took the view that he was free to choose
whatever advisers he liked. He was anxious to obtain the assistance of
British or American Zionist Jews for this purpose. The Ziuonists would
be acceptable to the Arabs, on terms.'25
Note:
25. Minutes of the 37th
meeting of the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet, 29.10.1918. CAB
27/24 fo.150.
Gilbert Clayton's views,
November 1918 (Wilson pp. 582-3)
[On
1918 November 1918],
a long telegram was received from Clayton. This began by setting out the
attitudes of the local populations, area
by area, and then discussed the implications of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement:
'The arrangement for a division of the independent Arab area into
an 'A' and 'B' sphere, the one controlled by France
and the other by Great Britain, presents almost insuperable practical
difficulties from an administrative point of view. If an Arab Government
is to function with any degree of efficiency, it must have a system
of administration applying equally to all areas under its control
and operating from one central [point], which in this case must be
Damascus.
'It
is impracticable to divide the territories into two parts (one
of which contains the capital) and to lay down that advice and
assistance
must come from France in the one half and from Great Britain in the
other.
'For many years to come, advice and assistance to the newly formed
Arab State must entail a considerable measure of actual administration.
French and British methods of administration are widely different,
and confusion and inefficiency must result. Worst of all, such an
arrangement contains the seeds of future friction between France and
Great Britain in a region where the policies of the two countries
have been in opposition for many years.'39
In
order to avoid such a clash, Clayton proposed that Britain should
be the trustee of Palestine, and adviser to the independent Arab state
based on Damascus (this should include the port of Tripoli and a coastal
strip). France should be the trustee of an autonomous Lebanon including
the Bekaa and Beirut, and also trustee and adviser to an autonomous
Armenia (including the port of Alexandretta). Arrangements could easily
be made to safeguard French economic interests in Syria, and any further
concession to French imperial ambitions should be made elsewhere.
Clayton
now had to deal with the practical consequences of the Balfour
Declaration, and he added: 'a sound administration established at
Damascus would permit . . . the development of the arable country
to the east of the Jordan and the construction of communications to
enable its produce to be exported with profit. The districts east
of the Jordan are thinly populated and their development would allow
. . . considerable
emigration from Palestine thereby making room
for Jewish expansion.
'It
should be noted that it is essential to impress on the Zionists
that the complete fulfilment of [their] aspirations cannot be looked
for at once and that undue haste in pushing their programme will only
react against their own interests.'40
There
was thus unanimity among those who had dealt with the Arab question from
Egypt during the preceding years. However, a long note from
Monsieur Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, dispelled any illusion
that his Government's policy had softened as a result of Feisal's
contribution to the Allied victory. France now demanded that the
Sykes-Picot terms, as agreed between Britain and France, should be
fulfilled
to the letter: 'on no point, whether at Damascus, Aleppo, or at
Mosul, is [France] prepared to relinquish in any way the rights which
she holds through the 1916 Agreement, whatever the provisional
administrative arrangements called for by a passing military situation.'41
Notes:
39.
G. F. Clayton to Foreign Office, London, telegram 190, 18.11.1918.
FO371/3385 fos 174-5.
40.
Ibid. fos 176-6
41.
Note [to the Foreign Office] communicated by P. Cambon 18.11.1918.
FO371/3385 fo. 163.
Meeting
between Feisal and Weizmann, December 1918 (Wilson pp. 592-3)
On
[11 December 1918], there was a meeting between Feisal and Chaim
Weizmann,
during which Lawrence acted as interpreter. Both leaders were now
in a position to help one another politically: the Zionists needed
Arab acquiescence to their programme in Palestine, while Feisal knew
that Jewish support during the Peace Conference might help to swing
American opinion behind his cause. Lawrence had already impressed
upon Feisal the potential value of Jewish capital and skills.
According
to his own contemporary account, Weizmann assured Feisal
that the Zionists in Palestine 'should . . . be able to carry out
public works of a far-reaching character, and . . . the country could
be so improved that it would have room for four or five million Jews,
without encroaching on the ownership rights of Arab peasantry.'61
Feisal
replied that 'it was curious there should be friction between
Jews and Arabs in Palestine. There was no friction in any other country
where Jews lived together with Arabs . . . He did not think for a
moment that there was any scarcity of land in Palestine. The population
would always have enough, especially if the country were developed.
Besides, there was plenty of land in his district.'62
Notes:
61.
C. Weizmann: 'Dr. Weizmann's interview with Emir Faisal at the Carlton
Hotel, December 11th 1918. Colonel Lawrence acting as interpreter.'
FO371/3420.
62.
Ibid. There were further contacts between Feisal and Weizmann in
London, and on 3 January 1919 they signed an 'Agreement between the King
of thre Hedjaz and the Zionists'. The text is reprinted in D. Hunter
Miller, My Diaries of the Conference of Paris (New York, Appeal
Printing, 1924), Vol. 3, p.p. 188-9.
The
Arab Case, December 1918 (Wilson pp. 595-6)
During
the last days of December, Lawrence and Feisal worked on a memorandum
setting out the Arab case. This document would be Feisal's principal
submission to the Peace Conference, and its tone was no
less important than its content. His only remaining hope of success
lay with the Americans, and the memorandum was therefore addressed
directly to the idealism that was thought to inspire President Wilson's
policy. A heavily amended draft, in Lawrence's handwriting, survives,
but the memorandum was to be signed by Feisal. In its final form,
it read:
' . . . In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are
Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is
no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are
absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the
responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and
religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world
in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position
of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration
commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of
the country.
. . .'70
Note:
70.
'Memorandum by the Emir Feisal'. FO 608/80 fo. 122. Lawrence's surviving
manuscript (a slightly earlier draft) is Houghton MS Eng 1252 (341).
Clayton's
views, March 1919 (Wilson pp. 601-3)
Another
important figure was Clayton, whose opinions would doubtless have
carried more weight if he had been free to leave his duties
in the Middle East and attend the Paris Conference. As Allenby's chief
political adviser, he had to deal personally with the situation that
was developing in Syria and Palestine. He foresaw the consequences
of an unsatisfactory settlement and, in a memorandum of March 11th,
set out the British dilemma and its likely results. He wrote: 'We are
committed to three distinct policies in Syria and Palestine:-
A.
We
are bound by the principles of the Anglo-French Agreement
of 1916 [Sykes-Picot], wherein we renounced any claim to predominant
influence in Syria.
B.
Our
agreements with King Hussein . . . have pledged us
to support the establishment of an Arab state, or confederation of
states, from which we cannot exclude the purely Arab portions of Syria
and Palestine.
C.
We
have definitely given our support to the principle of
a Jewish home in Palestine and, although the initial outlines of the
Zionist programme have been greatly exceeded by the proposals now
laid before the Peace Congress, we are still committed to a large
measure of support to Zionism.
'The
experience of the last few months has made it clear that these
three policies are incompatible . . . and that no compromise is possible
which will be satisfactory to all three parties:-
a.
French
domination in Syria is repudiated by the Arabs of
Syria, except by the Maronite Christians and a small minority amongst
other sections of the population.
b.
The
formation of a homogeneous Arab State is impracticable
under the dual control of two Powers whose system and methods of
administration
are so widely different as those of France and England.
c.
Zionism
is increasingly unpopular both in Syria and Palestine
where the somewhat exaggerated programme put forward recently by the
Zionist leaders has seriously alarmed all sections of the non-Jewish
majority. The difficulty of carrying out a Zionist policy in Palestine
will be enhanced if Syria is handed over to France and Arab confidence
in Great Britain undermined thereby.
'It
is impossible to discharge all our liabilities, and we are forced,
therefore, to break, or modify, at least one of our agreements.'7
Clayton
foresaw serious consequences if Britain handed Syria to France,
and then sought to impose Zionism in Palestine: 'The French will
certainly
meet with great obstruction, and possibly armed resistance from the
Arabs who will doubtless be supported by the Arabs of the Hedjaz sphere.
Great Britain, as the controlling Power in Palestine, will be pressed
by France to enforce the neutrality of beduins in the Palestine
hinterland
and to close the lines of communication between Hedjaz and Damascus.
Our influence with the Arabs will have been greatly impaired, firstly
by the fact that we shall be held to have sold Syria to the French,
and secondly by our support of the unpopular Zionist programme.'8
In
this situation, Clayton argued, Britain would have to maintain
a costly army of occupation in Palestine and, 'by definitely alienating
Arab sentiment,'9 would also incur very unfavourable
consequences for British interests and influence in the Arabian
Peninsula
and even Mesopotamia.
This
led to a conclusion which few British politicians at that time
would have found palatable: if Britain did not take both Palestine
and Syria, she should take neither of them: 'If France must have
Syria it would be preferable that America, or some Power other than
Great Britain or France, be given the Mandate for Palestine.' Clayton
continued: 'The alternative is to offer to France such inducement
as will lead her to renounce her claims in Syria, and to give to
some other Power the mandate for both Syria and Palestine. It is
only thus that a compromise might be arrived at, between Arab
aspirations
for a united and autonomous Syria and Zionist demands for a Jewish
Commonwealth in Palestine . . . In these circumstances the Power
entrusted
with the Mandate can only be America or Great Britain.'10
As
the weeks passed, it became increasingly clear that Clayton was
right. Both the British and American Delegations could foresee the
additional difficulties which would face the Zionist programme in
Palestine if the Arabs were alienated in Syria. Yet there was one
immovable factor which prevented a satisfactory solution: namely the
attitude of France.
Notes:
7.
G. F. Clayton, memorandum, 11.3.1919. Lloyd George papers F/205/3/9.
House of Lords.
8.
Ibid.
9.
Ibid.
10.
Ibid.
At
the Peace Conference, 1919 (Wilson pp. 606-7)
The
Zionist lobby was powerful in America as in Britain, and the Great
Powers continued to ignore this conflict of principle, discouraging
those who drew attention to it. Stephen Bonsal, one of the aides in
the American Delegation, was embarrassed when Lawrence brought to
him a draft memorandum in which Feisal expressed mounting anxiety
on the matter. In outline, according to Bonsal's memoirs, the memorandum
ran: 'If the views of the radical Zionists, as presented to the [Peace
Conference], should prevail, the result will be a ferment, chronic
unrest, and sooner or later civil war in Palestine. But I hope I will
not be misunderstood. I assert that we Arabs have none of the racial
or religious animosity against the Jews which unfortunately prevail
in many other regions of the world. I assert that with the Jews who
have been seated for some generations in Palestine our relations are
excellent. But the new arrivals exhibit very different qualities from
those "old settlers" as we call them, with whom we have been
able to live and even co-operate on friendly terms. For want of a
better word I must say that new colonists almost without exception
have come in an imperialistic spirit. They say that too long we have
been in control of their homeland taken from them by brute force in
the dark ages, but that now under the new world order we must clear
out; and if we are wise we should do so peaceably without making any
resistance to what is the fiat of the civilised world.'23
Note.
23.
S. Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, The Little Nations at Versailles
(New York, Prentice Hall, 1946) p. 56.
From
'The Changing East' [by T.E. Lawrence, unsigned],
Round Table, September 1920
Two new elements of some interest have just set foot in
Asia, coming rather as adventurers by sea - the Greeks
in Smyrna, and the Jews in Palestine. Of the two efforts
the Greek is frankly an armed occupation - a desire to
hold a tit-bit of Asiatic Turkey, for reasons of trade
and population, and from it to influence affairs in the
interior. It appears to have no constructive
possibilities so far as the New Asia is concerned. The
Jewish experiment is in another class. It is a conscious
effort, on the part of the least European people in
Europe, to make head against the drift of the ages, and
return once more to the Orient from which they came. The
colonists will take back with them to the land which
they occupied for some centuries before the Christian
era samples of all the knowledge and technique of
Europe. They propose to settle down amongst the existing
Arabic-speaking population of the country, a people of
kindred origin, but far different social condition. They
hope to adjust their mode of life to the climate of
Palestine, and by the exercise of their skill and
capital to make it as highly organised as a European
state. The success of their scheme will involve
inevitably the raising of the present Arab population to
their own material level, only a little after themselves
in point of time, and the consequences might be of the
highest importance for the future of the Arab world. It
might well prove a source of technical supply rendering
them independent of industrial Europe, and in that case
the new confederation might become a formidable element
of world power. However, such a contingency will not be
for the first or even for the second generation, but it
must be borne in mind in any laying out of foundations
of empire in Western Asia. These to a very large extent
must stand or fall by the course of the Zionist effort,
and by the course of events in Russia.
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